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1. Introduction 
 
It is well-understood in the endogenous growth literature that fiscal policy has 
potentially important effects on the long-run growth rate of the economy. In this 
context, the effect of productive government spending on the growth rate becomes 
important. In a seminal article, Barro (1990) models this in terms of public services – 
a flow variable – being in the economy’s production function. Futagami et al. (1993) 
introduce public capital – a stock variable – instead, and this is sufficient to give rise 
to transitional dynamics. Also in an endogenous growth framework, Ghosh and Roy 
(2004) introduce both public capital and public services as inputs in the production of 
the final good, and demonstrate that optimal fiscal policy in an economy depends not 
only on the tax rate but also on the apportionment of tax revenues between the 
accumulation of public capital and the provision of public services. The relationship 
between the composition of government expenditure and growth is investigated by 
Devarajan et al. (1996) as well. They consider two productive services (i.e., both flow 
variables)1 in a CES production function in their theoretical model – one more 
productive than another, and derive the important result that a shift in favour of an 
‘objectively’ more productive type of expenditure may not raise the growth rate if its 
initial share is ‘too high’. They also try to determine empirically which components of 
public expenditure are more productive in developing countries and find, somewhat 
surprisingly, that an increase in the share of current – rather than capital – expenditure 
has positive and statistically significant growth effects. 
 
Devarajan et al. (1996) suggest that an attempt to study optimal fiscal policy, instead 
of taking the government’s decisions as given, could be a ‘fruitful extension’ of their 
paper. This is exactly what we attempt to do in this paper.2 Within a decentralised 
economy set-up, we characterise the welfare-maximising fiscal policy for a 
benevolent government, which chooses the fiscal instruments at its disposal to 
                                                
1
 This is how this model differs from Ghosh and Roy (2004). 
2
 A recent theoretical paper by Chen (2006) considers an endogenous growth model where the 
benevolent government chooses the optimal composition of spending. This optimal spending 
composition is determined by all policy and other structural parameters, which raise the marginal utility 
of private relative to public composition, thereby inducing public investment and increasing growth. 
Although that paper deals with the optimal spending composition, it is different from ours because 
government consumption spending is in the utility function and government production spending is in 
the production function. Also, unlike us, the tax rate is exogenously given. 
maximise the representative agent’s utility.3 Our model solves for the three key 
endogenous variables, the optimal expenditure shares of the two services, the optimal 
tax rate, and the optimal growth rate in terms of the key technological and behavioural 
parameters of the model.4 We then try to determine from the data on capital and 
current public spending (which are commonly perceived as being more and less 
productive respectively), whether the actual growth performance of a sample of 
developing countries shows that fiscal policies have been pursued in an optimal 
manner, and whether capital or current spending ought to be interpreted as the more 
productive component of public expenditure from an optimal fiscal policy 
perspective.5 
 
Our empirical results clearly show that current – rather than capital – spending has 
contributed to growth, and in this sense, our results conform to Devarajan et al. 
(1996). The authors, however, link this result to their theoretical model in suggesting 
that ‘expenditures which are normally considered productive could become 
unproductive if there is an excessive amount of them’, and capital spending in 
developing countries may have squeezed current spending at the margin. But given 
that current spending as a proportion of GDP has typically been above 17% in 
contrast to capital spending as a ratio of GDP, which has been below 3% in our 
sample of 15 countries over 1972-99 (and the values are quite similar for the sample 
of countries chosen by Devarajan et al. (1996)), the way the authors have linked their 
empirical results to their analytical model seems somewhat unconvincing. From an 
optimal fiscal policy perspective, we can argue that countries which have correctly 
perceived current spending as being more productive have increased the share of 
spending on this category of public goods, and this has led to higher growth, and 
countries that have not done this have lost out. 
 
                                                
3
 In Appendix A, we derive the social optimum as an ideal (if unrealistic) benchmark, where the social 
planner – in contrast to the benevolent government in a decentralised economy – chooses private 
consumption and private investment for the agent in addition to choosing the fiscal instruments, τ, g1 
and g2. 
4
 Thus, while in the Devarajan et al. (1996) model, the economy’s growth rate is expressed in terms of 
the tax rate and expenditure shares, which are both exogenous (eq. (7)); in our extension of their model, 
the optimal growth rate is expressed in terms of optimal values of those two variables (eq. 21). 
5
 In terms of econometric methodology, we attempt to capture fiscal policy where the tax rate and 
expenditure shares are not chosen optimally, by the OLS and GMM single equation technique, and 
optimal fiscal policy (where the key variables are jointly determined) through the GMM system. This 
distinguishes our empirical analysis from that of Devarajan et al. (1996). 
It is also quite likely that countries that have allocated funds towards capital spending 
and away from current spending have often done so for reasons other than 
productivity considerations, and this is where the role of corruption assumes 
importance. As Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) have noted, private enterprises often get 
contracts for large public investment projects by paying a hefty “commission” to 
government officials. This shows that capital spending is highly discretionary, and the 
same is not true for current spending, which generally reflects spending on previous 
commitments (for example, wages, salaries, pensions, subsidies), thus allowing 
limited discretion in the short-run to politicians. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets up the theoretical 
framework and derives the analytical results under optimal fiscal policy. Section 3 
discusses the data, specifies the econometric model and methodology, and reports the 
empirical estimates. Section 4 links the theoretical results with the empirical analysis. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.1. The Devarajan et al. (1996) model with optimal fiscal policy 
 
In this section we first write down the key equations of the Devarajan et al. (1996) 
model, and then characterise the optimal fiscal policy (henceforth abbreviated as 
OFP) of the government. They consider a CES technology (where y is output, k is 
private capital, and g1, g2 are two types of government spending), which is given by 
 
ζζζζ γβα 121 ][ −−−− ++= ggky          (1), 
where α > 0, β ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0, α + β + γ = 1, ζ ≥ -1. 
 
The government’s budget constraint is 
21 ggy +=τ                      (2), 
where τ is the (constant over time) income tax rate. 
 
The shares of government expenditure that go toward g1 (φ) and g2 (1-φ) are given by 
ygandyg τφφτ )1(21 −==         (3), 
where 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. 
 
The representative consumer’s utility function is isoelastic, and derived from private 
consumption, and is given by 
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where ρ (> 0) is the rate of time preference. 
The representative consumer’s constraint is 
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ζζζζ
α
φγβφτ 1)1(





 −−−
=
−−
k
g
       (6), 
and of the economy’s (endogenous) growth rate given by 
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 We now characterise OFP in this model. We take eqs. (1) – (5) as being given exactly 
as in Devarajan et al. (1996). The representative agent’s problem is to choose c and k  
to maximise utility—which is U in (4)—subject to (5), taking τ, g1 and g2, and also k0 
as given. The first order conditions give rise to the Euler equation: 
k
y
c
c
∂
∂
−=+ )1( τρ           (8). 
 
 The task of the government in a decentralised economy is to run the public sector in 
the nation’s interest, taking the private sector’s choices as given.6 In other words, the 
government’s problem is to choose τ, g1 and g2 to maximise the representative agent’s 
utility subject to (2), (5) and (8), taking k0 as given. The first order conditions with 
respect to τ, g1 and g2 respectively yield 
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 This is sometimes called in the literature, the government’s ‘Ramsey policy problem’. See, for 
instance, Bruce and Turnovsky (1999), p. 174. See also Sarte and Soares (2003), p. 41. 
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where  and  are the co-state variables associated with the private and government 
budget constraints – (5) and (2) – respectively. 
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The value of g/k is given in (6) above. Hence, using (12), we can obtain the individual 
values of g1/k and g2/k: 
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We are now in a position to find an expression for the optimal tax rate for the 
decentralised economy under a benevolent government. From the government budget 
constraint given by (2), and given the optimal shares (of output) of the two productive 
inputs given by (15) and (16) above, the optimal tax rate is given by 
1
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Finally, the optimal share of the first public service from a welfare-maximising point 
of view is obtained by combining equations (3), (15) and (17): 
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Clearly then, the optimal share of the second public service is obtained by combining 
equations (3), (16) and (17): 
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Combining (12), (18) and (19), we obtain the following equation: 
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Finally, one can derive an expression for the growth rate that could be achieved in an 
economy where a benevolent government chooses its fiscal instruments, τ, g1 and g2, 
to maximise the welfare of the representative agent. This optimal growth rate 
expression can be obtained by combining equation (7) with equations (17), (18) and 
(19), and is given by 
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We have thus analytically characterised optimal fiscal policy in the Devarajan et al. 
(1996) model. As is clear from eqs. (17) – (21) above, we obtain closed-form 
solutions to all the important fiscal variables in terms of the key technological and 
behavioural parameters of the model. So, there are interesting implications for policy 
when we consider the case where the government formulates fiscal policy with a view 
to maximising the welfare of the representative agent, rather than taking as ‘given’ the 
tax rate and expenditure shares on the two public goods. 
 
2.2. Comparative statics 
 
In this section we study how the key variables: the optimal growth rate (λ*), the 
optimal tax rate (τ*), and the ratio of the optimal shares of the two public services, 
(φ*/(1-φ*)), respond to a change in the productivity parameter, β, where β is the share 
in the production function of the (a priori) more productive public good (β > γ). 
First, from eq. (21), we find dλ*/dβ: 
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If β = γ (the two components of public spending are equally productive), then a rise in 
β at the margin does not affect the optimal growth rate. But if one component (g1) is 
more productive than another (g2), then an increase in the productivity of that input 
(β, which is the share of g1 in the production function) will raise the growth rate. So it 
is important to identify which in reality is the more productive input, as an increase in 
its share in the production function would bolster growth. Conversely, an increase in 
the share of the less productive input in the production function will have an adverse 
effect on growth.7 
 
Next, from eq. (17), we find dτ*/dβ: 
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Again, if β = γ, the marginal effect of an increase in the productivity of one of the 
public goods will not make a difference to how the optimal tax rate behaves. 
However, if β > γ, then an increase in the share of the more productive input in the 
production function will reduce the optimal tax rate because the higher productivity 
translates into higher output, and this will generate higher tax revenues, which thereby 
requires a lower tax rate to balance the government budget. So, from a welfare-
maximising perspective, an increase in the productivity of the more productive public 
good leads to a fall in the optimal tax rate. 
 
 
                                                
7
 As we shall see later, empirically it turns out that the current – rather than capital – component of 
expenditure is the more productive; so g1 should be interpreted as current rather than capital 
expenditure. An increase in the share of current expenditure in the production function ought to favour, 
rather than hinder, growth, contrary to popular belief. 
Finally, from eq. (20), we find d(φ*/(1-φ*))/dβ: 
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Having derived the comparative statics results analytically, we proceed to find 
numerically how the optimal values of (λ, τ, φ) change with changes in β. The 
numerical simulations are reported in Table 1.  
 
TABLE 1. Simulation results for (λ*, τ*, φ*) corresponding to different values of 
α, β, γ 
α
 
β
 
γ
 
λ* τ* φ* 
0.25 0.40 0.35 -0.00985 0.8829 0.5278 
0.25 0.50 0.25 -0.00977 0.8762 0.6405 
0.25 0.60 0.15 -0.00944 0.8591 0.7605 
0.25 0.70 0.05 -0.00745 0.8252 0.9002 
0.50 0.25 0.25 0.00520 0.6300 0.5000 
0.50 0.30 0.20 0.00572 0.6282 0.5837 
0.50 0.40 0.10 0.01089 0.6128 0.7605 
0.50 0.45 0.05 0.01790 0.5964 0.8619 
0.75 0.15 0.10 0.09047 0.3526 0.5837 
0.75 0.20 0.05 0.10025 0.3439 0.7605 
 
For the simulations, the other parameter values chosen are as follows: ζ = 0.2, σ = 2, ρ = 0.02. 
 
 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
Like Devarajan et al. (1996), our empirical analysis focuses on the link between 
various components of government expenditure and economic growth in developing 
countries, but we try to establish this link in the context of optimal fiscal policy, 
where one of the public inputs has higher productivity in the sense that it has a larger 
share in the production function, a priori. In this context, we do not include 
government consumption that directly affects utility, as in Barro (1990), Section V, or 
as suggested by Aschauer and Greenwood (1985). For one thing, we are interested in 
government expenditure that directly affects production rather than utility.8 For 
another, the former can be appropriately distinguished from productivity-augmenting 
government expenditure from the functional definition of government spending. As 
regards productive public goods, Aschauer (1989) finds that investment in core 
infrastructure in the US raised the productivity of private capital over a period of 
almost 40 years (1949-85), leading to higher growth; and Easterly and Rebelo (1993) 
find that public investment in transport and communications has a direct impact on 
growth. On the contrary, Evans and Karras (1994) and Holtz-Eakin (1994) both 
showed, after controlling for unique state effects, that the elasticity of output with 
respect to public capital was not significantly different from zero in a panel of 48 US 
states. While the economic rather than functional classification of expenditure9 is 
considered in this paper, investment in public education is viewed as productive, and 
the same applies to health, while defence spending is considered unproductive, 
although Barro (1991) considers it productive as it helps protect property rights. 
Consequently, education and health would typically be part of government capital 
expenditure, while defence would be a component of current expenditure. 
 
As far as investigation into the effect of different constituents of public expenditure 
on growth is concerned, we have noted in the introduction that Devarajan et al. (1996) 
found a positive (negative) and significant relationship between the current (capital) 
component of public expenditure and per capita real GDP growth for 43 countries 
from 1970 through 1990. In an empirical study with a sample of 39 low income 
countries during the period, 1990-2000, Gupta et al. (2005) show that fiscal 
                                                
8
 This is why our OFP analysis differs from Chen (2006). 
9
 For a detailed description of the classification of expenditure, see Devarajan et al. (1996), p. 323, 
footnote 9. 
consolidations achieved through cutting selected current expenditures tend to raise 
growth rates, while protecting capital expenditures does the same. Though this result 
is consistent with developed country experiences, it contradicts the results of 
Devarajan et al. (1996) and ours, as will be clear from Section 3.3. 
 
Like Devarajan et al. (1996), we do not classify public expenditures as being 
productive and unproductive to begin with, but let the data ‘do the talking’. As we 
shall see, if the regression results show that capital expenditures, which are thought to 
be more productive than current expenditure a priori, do show themselves to be 
having more growth effects, then we can say that capital items are indeed more 
productive than current items. If, on the other hand, optimal fiscal policies dictate that 
growth rates ought to be higher when the share of a priori more productive (i.e., 
capital) expenditure exceeds that of a priori more productive (i.e., capital) 
expenditure, but the regressions show that this is not the case, then we can conclude 
that current rather than capital spending has been the more productive component, 
contrary to popular belief. 
 
Like Devarajan et al. (1996), we consider a sample consisting of only developing 
countries, whereas most existing studies consider either a mixed sample of developed 
and developing countries or focus exclusively on developed countries. As in their 
study, we have a pooled cross-section/time series data set, which enables us to capture 
some of the lags involved in translating productive public expenditures into economic 
growth. 
 
3.1. Data and choice of variables 
 
The empirical analysis uses panel data on 15 countries10 from 1972 to 1999, to 
examine the link between components of government expenditure and growth from a 
welfare-maximising perspective.11 We use annual data obtainable from the Global 
Development Network Growth Database compiled by William Easterly.12 
                                                
10
 The countries chosen for our study are as follows: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Mexico 
(South America), Cameroon, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, Zimbabwe (Africa), India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Thailand (Asia). 
11
 On the panel data approach to studying empirical growth models, see Islam (1995). 
12
 We have chosen 15 major countries from the three continents for which the complete data set was 
available from the Easterly database. 
 
The model in Section 2 linked growth with shares from an OFP perspective: clearly, 
from eq. (21), the optimal growth rate, λ* is linked to the parameters, α, β, γ, σ and ρ, 
and as eq. (22), Section 3 shows, dλ*/dβ > 0 depends on β > γ. In other words, the 
share in the production function of the ‘objectively’ more productive input has to be 
greater than that of the less productive input. It now remains to be seen whether it is 
the capital component of expenditure in the production function that is the more 
productive input and the current component of expenditure that is the less productive 
input, or the other way round. 
 
To control for level effects, we include the share of government spending in GDP. As 
is clear from the theoretical model, the optimal income tax rate (which turns out to be 
the share of government spending in GDP, given that government spending is wholly 
productive, and income taxes are the only form of taxes) is a function of the 
parameters α and β, with dτ*/dβ < 0 depending on β > γ. This also allows us to 
control for the effects of financing government expenditure on growth. 
 
Finally, as in Devarajan et al. (1996), the ‘black market premium’ variable captures 
the effects of other domestic policies (i.e., other than productive public spending) in 
countries that also affect the growth rate. This variable, obtained from the Easterly 
database, is the premium on the official rate in the black market for foreign exchange. 
 
The dependent variable is chosen as the per capita real GDP growth rate in the first set 
of regressions (Table 2). To account for the lag between the spending on public goods 
and the effect on output growth, we use a five year forward moving average to 
eliminate business cycle type short-run fluctuations induced by shifts in public 
spending, and this also increases the number of time series observations in our panel 
data. This is provided in Table 3. As pointed by Devarajan et al. (1996), the five year 
forward lag structure addresses the joint endogeneity of variables and the possibility 
of reverse causality.13 In a sense, the joint endogeneity of public expenditure and 
growth is an issue that should be taken more seriously in our framework, given that 
we are considering OFP where, in theory, these variables are, indeed, determined 
jointly.  
 
                                                
13
 See Devarajan et al., p. 322 for details. 
The model specification for the first set of regressions is: 
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where i and t denote the cross-sectional and time series dimensions respectively; ai 
captures the time-invariant unobserved country-specific fixed effects and bt captures 
the unobservable individual-invariant time effects. G is the per capita real GDP 
growth rate, g1 is ‘capital expenditure’, and g2 is ‘current expenditure’, both from the 
‘Government Finance’ account in the Easterly database, y is GDP at market prices, k 
is the gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP, and bmp is the black 
market premium. 
 
The model specification for the second set of regressions is: 
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We use the classification of government expenditure used in the Easterly database. In 
line with the theoretical model, we have the share of current spending as a proportion 
of total public spending as the first explanatory variable the ratio of total public 
spending to output as the second variable and the ratio of capital-output ratio to 
government spending-output ratio.14 
 
3.2. Methodology 
 
Though the OLS fixed effects model captures the effects of fiscal policy when the tax 
rate and government expenditure shares are exogenously given, the GMM single 
equation model, it can be argued, captures the endogeneity aspects of the model 
better, given the cross-country heterogeneity in the data. This is why we use the latter 
method for our estimations. However, for the OFP exercise, we feel that the GMM 
                                                
14
 Note that the Easterly database provides data on gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of 
GDP, while g1 and g2 refer to capital and current spending at market prices respectively; so (g1 + g2) 
has to be divided by y to make units comparable. 
system is probably the ideal methodology to capture the endogeneity involved in the 
joint determination of the key variables (φ*, λ*, τ*) in the theoretical model.15 In a 
model where the shares of the more and less productive inputs are arbitrarily fixed, 
fiscal policy can be captured by the OLS fixed effects model and/or the GMM single 
equation model. But in the OFP version, clearly optimal φ (φ*) is not an arbitrarily 
chosen constant, but is determined endogenously in terms of the parameters, α and β. 
The same applies for optimal λ and τ. This joint endogeneity of variables in the OFP 
case distinguishes our study from that of Devarajan et al. (1996) on the theoretical 
side, while our use of the GMM system to capture OFP distinguishes our work from 
the authors on the empirical side.16 
 
The OLS fixed effects model, also known as the Least Squares Dummy Variable 
(LSDV) model, and the Instrumental Variable estimator are often applied to panel 
estimations. Even though these methods are extensively used in the panel literature, 
they fail to capture cross-country heterogeneity. In order to capture the cross-country 
heterogeneity in the data, we use the system GMM estimator. The GMM estimators 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) make use of lagged instruments of the 
endogenous variables for each time period to tackle possible endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables in the panel. For a brief description of the GMM panel 
estimators we rewrite our equation as:  
 
itittiit eXbaG +++=  
 
where Git is the GDP growth for country i at time period t, ai is the time-invariant 
unobserved country-specific fixed effect (e.g., differences in the initial level of GDP 
growth), bt captures the unobservable individual-invariant time effects (e.g., shocks 
that are common to all countries), itX is a vector of the explanatory variables and ite  is 
the error for country i at time period t. If ( ) 0it izE e e =  holds for z t≠  across all the 
countries then it represents the following moment conditions:  
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 From the theoretical model in section 2, it is clear that while in eq. (7), λ is expressed in terms of τ 
(exogenous) and φ (exogenous); in eq. (21), λ* (optimal λ) is expressed in terms of τ* (optimal τ - 
endogenous) and φ* (optimal φ - endogenous). 
16
 Gupta et al. (2005) attempt to address the endogeneity problem by using the GMM (single equation) 
estimator, as we do, but do not use the system GMM, which we use in order to capture OFP. 
( ) 0
,
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If itX are weakly exogenous then we also have the following additional moment 
conditions: 
 ( ) 0
,
=∆
− itzti eXE  for 2;    3,......., .z t T≥ =  
 
The single equation GMM panel estimator generally specifies a dynamic panel model 
in first differences and exploits the above moment conditions.17 Therefore, the lagged 
(two time periods or more) levels of endogenous and weakly endogenous variables of 
the model become appropriate instruments for addressing endogeneity. The single 
GMM panel estimator provides consistent coefficient estimates.  
 
However, when the time-series dimension of the panel is fairly small, the single 
equation estimator suffers from the problem of weak instruments. In other words, 
there is a weak correlation between the regressors and the instruments. As a result of 
this problem, the estimated coefficients suffer from poor precision (see, among others, 
Staiger and Stock, 1997). We can overcome this problem by using the panel GMM 
system estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998), which radically reduces the imprecision associated with the single equation 
estimator. The system GMM estimator estimates a system of equations in first 
differences and levels by stacking the data. It combines the standard set of (T-z) 
transformed equations with an additional set of (T-z) equations in levels (note 2).z ≥  
The first set of transformed equations continues to use the lag levels as instruments. 
The level equation on the other hand, use the lagged first differences as instruments. 
Their validity is based on the following moment conditions:18    
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 The model is transformed into first differences in order to eliminate the fixed effects.  
18
 The time-varying matrix of instruments for the first difference GMM estimator can be observed in 
Blundell and Bond (1998). 
Bond et al. (2001) show that the system GMM estimator performs better then a range 
of other method of moment type estimators. The consistency of GMM estimators 
hinges crucially on whether the lagged values of the explanatory variables are a valid 
set of instruments and whether ite  is not serially correlated. We undertake Sargan’s 
instrument validity test (applicable to single equation GMM) and the Difference-
Sargan test (applicable to system GMM) to establish the validity of the instrument set. 
A first order serial correlation test is performed to test whether the error term suffers 
from serial correlation. 
 
3.3. Econometric estimates 
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TABLE 2. Contribution of the capital component of public spending (among 
others) to optimal growth 
Variable OLS (fixed effects) GMM Single GMM System 
Constant 13.49(2.01)* 13.44(2.39)* 13.43(2.41)* 
g1/(g1+g2) -0.25(-2.57)* -0.18(-2.14)* -0.17(-2.19)* 
(g1+g2)/y 0.33(3.02)* 0.36(2.92)* 0.39(2.77)* 
k/((g1+g2)/y) 0.48(2.16)* 0.51(2.24)* 0.52(2.29)* 
bmp -0.005(-0.72) 0.007(1.09) 0.008(1.05) 
ai (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
bt (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SE 0.126 0.126 0.126 
AR(1) (0.376) (0.389) (0.433) 
Sargan 
2 ( )rχ  
NA 248.9[473] 271.2[490] 
Diff Sargan 
2 ( )rχ  
NA NA 38.9[48] 
Observations 267 267 267 
 
For the OLS (fixed effects) model AR(1) is the first order Lagrange Multiplier test for residual serial 
correlation. SE represents the standard error of the panel estimator. Under GMM single equation and 
GMM system this test is undertaken on the first difference of the residuals because of the 
transformations involved. ai and bt are the fixed and time effects. Sargan tests follow a 2χ distribution 
with r degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis of valid instruments. The endogenous explanatory 
variables in the panel are GMM instrumented setting 3.z ≥  (.) are p values, (.) are t statistics, * 
indicate significant at all conventional levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
The table below represents the model above with the use of the five-year forward 
moving average of growth rather then growth itself.   
 
TABLE 3. Contribution of the capital component of public spending (among 
others) to optimal growth (with five-year forward moving average of growth) 
Variable OLS (fixed effects) GMM Single GMM System 
Constant 13.48(2.02)* 13.46(2.46)* 13.44(2.71)* 
g1/(g1+g2) -0.27(-2.31)* -0.20(-2.11)* -0.18(-2.14)* 
(g1+g2)/y 0.35(3.11)* 0.37(2.25)* 0.38(2.43)* 
k/((g1+g2)/y) 0.45(2.17)* 0.48(2.25)* 0.50(2.29)* 
bmp -0.003(-0.74) 0.005(1.08) 0.006(1.03) 
ai (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
bt (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SE 0.126 0.126 0.125 
AR(1) (0.374) (0.387) (0.430) 
Sargan 2 ( )rχ  NA 253.7[475] 274.3[492] 
Diff Sargan 2 ( )rχ  NA NA 39.6[49] 
Observations 267 267 267 
 
See notes for Table 2. 
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TABLE 4. Contribution of the current component of public spending (among 
others) to optimal growth 
Variable OLS (fixed effects) GMM Single GMM System 
Constant 13.51(2.01)* 13.48(2.39)* 13.46(2.41)* 
g2/(g1+g2) 0.24(2.62)* 0.20(2.17)* 0.19(2.22)* 
(g1+g2)/y 0.35(3.04)* 0.37(2.93)* 0.40(2.79)* 
k/((g1+g2)/y) 0.49(2.18)* 0.53(2.27)* 0.52(2.31)* 
bmp -0.006(-0.73) 0.008(1.11) 0.007(1.06) 
ai (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
bt (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SE 0.124 0.124 0.123 
AR(1) (0.372) (0.383) (0.425) 
Sargan 2 ( )rχ  NA 248.6[472] 270.9[488] 
Diff Sargan 2 ( )rχ  NA NA 38.6[48] 
Observations 267 267 267 
 
For the OLS (fixed effects) model AR(1) is the first order Lagrange Multiplier test for residual serial 
correlation. SE represents the standard error of the panel estimator. Under GMM single equation and 
GMM system this test is undertaken on the first difference of the residuals because of the 
transformations involved. ai and bt are the fixed and time effects. Sargan tests follow a 2χ distribution 
with r degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis of valid instruments. The endogenous explanatory 
variables in the panel are GMM instrumented setting 3.z ≥  (.) are p values, (.) are t statistics, * 
indicate significant at all conventional levels. 
 
The table below represents the model above with the use of the five-year forward 
moving average of growth rather then growth itself.   
 
TABLE 5. Contribution of the current component of public spending (among 
others) to optimal growth (with five-year forward moving average of growth) 
Variable OLS (fixed effects) GMM Single GMM System 
Constant 13.49(2.03)* 13.48(2.48)* 13.46(2.72)* 
g2/(g1+g2) 0.26(2.30)* 0.22(2.14)* 0.19(2.15)* 
(g1+g2)/y 0.34(3.12)* 0.35(2.26)* 0.39(2.44)* 
k/((g1+g2)/y) 0.47(2.19)* 0.49(2.26)* 0.52(2.27)* 
bmp -0.004(-0.76) 0.007(1.09) 0.008(1.05) 
ai (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
bt (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SE 0.125 0.125 0.126 
AR(1) (0.382) (0.394) (0.426) 
Sargan 2 ( )rχ  NA 252.8[475] 273.2[491] 
Diff Sargan 2 ( )rχ  NA NA 39.4[49] 
Observations 267 267 267 
 
See notes for Table 4. 
 
3.4. Explanation of results 
 
In all the empirical estimates, the fixed and time effects of the panel both appear 
significant, implying that the country- and time-specific shocks differ significantly 
across the nations in our sample. In addition, all estimated models pass the diagnostic 
tests.19 A test for first order residual serial correlation is insignificant which suggests 
that the panels do not suffer from serial correlation. Sargan tests confirm the validity 
of the instruments in both GMM models.20 
 
Table 2 shows that there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between 
the capital component of expenditure and optimal growth, and this is surprising at first 
glance, although a similar negative relation is obtained by Devarajan et al. (1996). 
Note, however, that here we are studying the link between optimal growth and public 
investment.21 From the OLS fixed effects model, we find that a unit increase in the 
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 We used three lags in our estimations, but also experimented with other lag structures. Our results 
are robust to 1, 2 and 4 lags. These results are obtainable upon request. 
20
 It should be noted that the serial correlation test for the GMM is done on the first difference of the 
residuals, whereas for the OLS (fixed effect) it is done on the actual residuals. 
21
 Note that the GMM system is used to capture OFP for the model (the aspect of joint determination of 
optimal values for the growth rate, tax rate and expenditure shares). We report only the growth rate 
estimates here in the fourth column of the Tables (under the ‘GMM System’ heading), as – from an 
empirical standpoint – we are primarily interested in the growth effects of the different components of 
government spending. 
ratio of capital to total spending decreases per capita real GDP growth by 25 
percentage points. A similar negative coefficient is obtained for the GMM single 
equation model, and for the GMM system, once again a negative coefficient is 
obtained. 
 
In the same regression, the public expenditure-to-GDP ratio is positive and 
statistically significant using all three methodologies. This is the level effect of total 
government spending on per capita growth, which has been found to be positive but 
insignificant by Devarajan et al. (1996). So this result of ours is somewhat different 
from their findings. This is intuitive, since we would generally expect that under OFP, 
the desirable condition that the productivity of public spending (that is financed by 
income taxes) exceeds the deadweight loss associated with distortionary taxation 
would be satisfied. 
 
Our theoretical model of Section 2 solves for an optimal value of k/g (ratio of private 
capital to public services), which is one of the important endogenous variables of our 
model. Hence, unlike Devarajan et al. (1996), we include this as an important 
determinant of the optimal growth rate. The coefficient on this variable is positive and 
significant for OLS (fixed effects), GMM (single equation) and the GMM system 
(and its value ranges from 0.45 to 0.50 in the three methods). The positive sign is 
clearly intuitive, given that public services in this model augment the productivity of 
private capital, and we would expect it to be significant. 
 
The black market premium is statistically insignificant in all the regressions. It means 
that factors other than the shares of public spending, the public spending-to-output 
ratio and the private-to-public spending ratio are insignificant in determining the 
welfare-maximising growth rate. Note that in Devarajan et al. (1996), this variable is 
statistically significant in most of the regressions. The reason for this could be that 
this variable picks up some of the effects of the private-to-public spending ratio in 
their regressions, whereas in our case the latter variable is clearly an important 
determinant of the growth rate.  
 
The only difference between the first and second set of regressions – for which the 
results are provided in Table 3 – is that in Table 3, the five year forward moving 
average of the growth rate is used, rather than the growth rate itself. The results are 
remarkably similar to those in Table 1, which suggests that our results are robust to 
the reverse causality problem. 
 
Table 4 presents the results for the regression of growth against the ratio of current 
public spending to total public spending, with other variables remaining as they were 
in Table 2. The coefficient on g2/(g1+g2) is now positive and significant, which 
contradicts accepted notions of how current spending ought to affect the growth rate, 
but is in accordance with the results obtained by Devarajan et al. (1996) for the same 
variable (their Eq. (3.1)). In the OLS fixed effects model specification, a unit increase 
in the g2/(g1+g2) ratio increases per capita real GDP growth by 24 percentage points. 
The coefficients on the other important variables remain strikingly similar to what 
was obtained in Table 2, and this is true for OLS (fixed effects), GMM (single 
equation) as well as the GMM system. 
 
Finally, Table 5 presents the same model as Table 4, but with the five-year forward 
moving average of growth. The striking similarity with Table 4 shows that the results 
are robust to reverse causality and to alternative specifications. 
 
One potential problem with the use of the GMM system estimator is that the 
properties hold when the number of countries is large. Therefore, the GMM system 
estimator may be bias and imprecise in our sample, given that we only have 15 
countries. An alternative approach to the GMM system estimator is based on the bias- 
correction of the LSDV model. Nickell (1981) demonstrates that the standard LSDV 
estimator is not consistent when the number of countries in the panel is small. Kiviet 
(1995) uses higher order asymptotic expansion techniques to approximate the small 
sample bias of the LSDV estimator.22 These approximations are evaluated at the 
unobserved true parameter values, so they cannot be estimated. Kiviet (1995) 
overcomes this shortcoming by replacing the true unobserved parameters with the 
estimates from some consistent estimators.   
 
Therefore, for robustness we re-estimate the OLS fixed effects model in Tables 2 and 
4 using the small sample bias correction provided by Kiviet (1995). The results can be 
seen in Tables 2a and 4a in Appendix B. As we can see, the OLS fixed effects results 
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 We thank Jonathan Temple for suggesting the use of  Kiviet’s bias-adjusted LSDV estimator. 
do not change, providing evidence that the panel GMM system estimator computes 
reliable parameter estimates for our sample, even though we only have 15 countries.23  
 
4. Linking theory under OFP with evidence, and possible implications  
 
Our starting point for this paper was the very interesting paper by Devarajan et al. 
(1996) on the link between the composition of government expenditure and long-run 
growth, where one component of public spending was objectively considered more 
productive than the other. However, this component could actually be less productive 
if its initial share (which is given arbitrarily) in the production function was too high. 
From the empirical evidence it was found that capital expenditures, which are 
generally assumed to be more productive, turn out to have a negative impact on 
growth, while current expenditures, usually considered less productive, have a 
positive impact on growth.24 This suggests that countries with an initially large 
(small) share of the objectively more productive component turn out to be less (more) 
productive at the margin.  
 
Our paper extends the above paper both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, 
we characterise OFP in terms of optimal growth, optimal productive shares, optimal 
tax rate, etc. The welfare maximising levels of all the key variables of the model 
mentioned here can be expressed in terms of the productivities of the inputs. So, 
unlike Devarajan et al. (1996), where the factor shares are arbitrary, here the optimal 
factor shares are determined in terms of β and γ. We have shown theoretically that 
dλ*/dβ > 0 if β > γ. If we go by the way the capital and current components of public 
spending are traditionally viewed, we would a priori expect the former to be more 
productive (i.e., the one we call g1 with the relative productivity, β), and the latter to 
be less productive (i.e., the one we call g2 with the relative productivity, γ), and expect 
that our econometric results would reflect that. The empirics, however, show that this 
is not the case: a rise in current spending raises the growth rate, and the opposite 
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 For completeness we also estimated Tables 3 and 5 with the use of the OLS fixed effects small 
sample bias correction. The OLS fixed effects results do not change. The results are not reported and 
are available upon request from the authors. 
24
 Note that Evans and Karras (1994) found fairly strong evidence that current government educational 
services are productive, but no evidence that the other government activities they considered are 
productive. In fact, they typically found negative productivity for government capital, and therefore, 
could not conclude that the US as a whole suffers from an infrastructure crisis – on the contrary, their 
study reveals that there could well have been an overprovision of government capital in the US. 
happens when capital spending is raised. It must then be that our a priori expectations 
about the relative productivities of current and capital components are misplaced, and 
g1 ought to represent current and g2, capital spending. Then only would the OFP story 
go through.  
 
This means that some countries which followed the traditional logic of spending on 
(supposedly more productive) capital goods ended up with worse growth 
performances than those that did just the opposite, not because these countries had 
already overspent on such types of goods, as Devarajan et al. (1996) have tried to 
deduce, but because those goods simply did not deliver the productivity increases that 
were expected of them. This could be due to the fact that these economies had 
distorted incentive structures, bureaucratic inefficiencies and/or corruption, and the 
fact that the goods produced from the public spending turned out to be of poor quality. 
The study by Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) shows, using cross-country data, that high 
corruption is associated with high public capital expenditures, but low operations and 
maintenance expenditures. This is understandable, given that the scope for indulging 
in corrupt practices is much higher for capital spending, given its nature.25 
 
It is in general often worthwhile to spend more on the maintenance of existing 
infrastructure, rather than embark on new projects while the existing infrastructure is 
in poor condition, because this could enable full capacity utilisation and therefore 
more output to be generated. Leaving aside the corruption issue, this ought to be the 
recommendation from an efficiency standpoint, and would make the case for current 
rather than capital expenditure.  
 
A point worth making is that thus far we have conducted our analysis with the 
implicit assumption that the government is typically utilitarian and seeks to maximise 
the lifetime utility of the representative agent. The fact that ex post, current spending 
turns out to be more productive could be due, in some measure, to the fact that 
corruption is associated with spending on new projects, and these decisions are taken 
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 The paper by Mauro (1998) provides cross-country evidence that corruption does affect the 
composition of government expenditure. Using corruption indices for the chosen countries, it shows 
that corruption reduces the spending on education, as it does not provide as many lucrative 
opportunities for government officials as certain other components of spending. This is mainly because 
its provision typically does not require high technology inputs provided by oligopolistic suppliers. 
by  (rent-seeking) bureaucrats on behalf of the (benevolent) government.26 If, instead 
of this, we assumed that the government and bureaucracy are comprised of self-
interested agents who could be subsumed into one corrupt entity, as in Ellis and 
Fender (2006), then our analytical results could be treated as being normative rather 
then positive, and our empirical results would reflect a sub-optimal outcome, where 
the productivity of public capital is low largely due to the reasons that we have spelt 
out. 
 
The findings from this study also have implications for the financing of investment 
projects. Corruption can contribute to tax evasion and inefficient tax administration, 
and therefore to low tax revenues,27 and given the link between corruption and capital 
spending, there is clearly a case for advocating more current spending. And as our 
theoretical model shows, the more productive component of public spending (ex post, 
the current component) contributes to higher growth, thereby requiring a lower tax 
rate to balance the budget.28 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper attempted to characterise OFP within an endogenous growth framework 
with two public goods, and one a priori less productive than another. From the 
theoretical model, we found out analytical expressions for the key variables like the 
optimal growth rate, optimal productive shares and optimal tax rate, and these were 
directly linked to the productivities of the two public goods in the production 
function. Judging by the way the components of public spending are traditionally 
viewed, we expected the capital (current) component to affect growth positively 
(negatively). But our empirical analysis using the OLS (fixed effects) model, the 
GMM single equation framework and the GMM system, all showed the reverse, i.e., 
the capital component affected growth negatively, contrary to a priori expectations. 
Our results are in accordance with the results obtained by Devarajan et al. (1996), 
although the value added of our paper from a theoretical standpoint arises from 
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 In other words, some sort of principal-agent problem a la Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) could be at 
work. 
27
 See, for example, Tanzi and Davoodi (1997). 
28
 If eq. (2) of our model were modified to incorporate public debt, then the interesting question as to 
whether the golden rule of public finance (see, for example, Buiter (2001), Ghosh and Mourmouras 
(2004) on this), whereby borrowing by the government is permitted only to finance its capital 
expenditure, should be advocated for developing country governments, is a case in point. 
characterising optimal fiscal policy, something that the authors have suggested as a 
future extension. On the empirical side, we have argued that the Devarajan et al. 
(1996) characterisation of fiscal policy with exogenous tax rates and expenditure 
shares can, perhaps be better characterised by the GMM single equation method as it 
captures the cross-country variation in the data better than the OLS (fixed effects) 
method, whereas our characterisation of optimal fiscal policy (whereby, theoretically, 
all key variables are endogenously determined) can be captured by the GMM system 
(where all variables are jointly determined from an empirical viewpoint). 
 
Our results have implications on how governments ought to allocate their 
expenditures on different types of public goods, given that if fiscal policies are 
pursued optimally, then expenditure shares are directly linked to productivities of 
these goods. Given the experiences of a number of developing countries from the 
three continents, it appears that the ones that have perceived correctly the 
productivities of the different types of public goods and allocated their expenditures in 
line with the productivities have done well, while those that have not done so have 
lost out. While Devarajan et al. (1996) have identified the bias in government 
spending in many countries, and linked this to spending on items that have already 
been excessively provided, we have identified the bias in terms of misperception of 
governments about their priorities. 
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Appendix A: The Social Optimum 
To characterise the social planner’s problem, we first need to redefine τ and φ. Let τ 
now denote the share of total output that is devoted by the planner to the provision of 
the two public services, g1 and g2. And φ now denotes the share of the total 
expenditure on the two public goods that is devoted by the planner to the provision of 
the more productive public good. 
 
Eqs. (1) – (5) characterise the basic model, as before. The social planner’s problem is 
to choose c (private consumption) and dk/dt (private investment) – in addition to τ, g1 
and g2 – to maximise the representative agent’s utility subject to (2), (5) and (8), 
taking k0 as given. The first order conditions with respect to c and k respectively, 
yield 
tec ρσµ −−= .      (A1), 
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   (A2). 
The first order conditions with respect to τ, g1 and g2 respectively, yield (9) – (11), as 
previously obtained. 
 
As a result, instead of the Euler equation given by (8), we now have: 
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, as for the decentralised economy, therefore we 
have (17) – (20), as before. So the socially optimum tax rate coincides with the 
optimal tax rate for the decentralised economy, and the same is true about the 
expenditure shares of the two public services. 
 
As (A3) differs from (8), the expression for the economy’s growth rate under the 
social planner will be different from that under a utilitarian government: 
σ
ργβαλ
ζζζζζ
−−−
=
+++− )1()1(1)1(11 ]1[SP
. 
 
Clearly, λSP > λ*, because the social planner can internalise externalities in a way that 
is not possible under a decentralised economy set-up, and hence, the socially optimum 
growth rate is higher than the decentralised growth rate. 
 Appendix B: Bias-Adjusted LSDV Method of Estimation 
 
TABLE 2a. Contribution of the capital component of public spending (among 
others) to optimal growth 
Variable OLS (fixed effects) corrected for small sample bias 
Constant 13.49(2.01)* 
g1/(g1+g2) -0.25(-2.57)* 
(g1+g2)/y 0.33(3.02)* 
k/((g1+g2)/y) 0.48(2.16)* 
bmp -0.005(-0.72) 
ai (0.00) 
bt (0.00) 
SE 0.126 
AR(1) (0.376) 
Sargan 
2 ( )rχ  
NA 
Diff Sargan 
2 ( )rχ  
NA 
Observations 267 
 
For the OLS (fixed effects) model corrected for small sample bias, AR(1) is the first order Lagrange 
Multiplier test for residual serial correlation. SE represents the standard error of the panel estimator. ai 
and bt are the fixed and time effects. (.) are p values, (.) are t statistics, * indicate significant at all 
conventional levels. 
 
 
 
TABLE 4a. Contribution of the current component of public spending (among 
others) to optimal growth 
Variable OLS (fixed effects) corrected for small sample bias 
Constant 13.51(2.01)* 
g2/(g1+g2) 0.24(2.62)* 
(g1+g2)/y 0.35(3.04)* 
k/((g1+g2)/y) 0.49(2.18)* 
bmp -0.006(-0.73) 
ai (0.00) 
bt (0.00) 
SE 0.124 
AR(1) (0.372) 
Sargan 2 ( )rχ  NA 
Diff Sargan 2 ( )rχ  NA 
Observations 267 
 
For the OLS (fixed effects) model corrected for small sample bias, AR(1) is the first order Lagrange 
Multiplier test for residual serial correlation. SE represents the standard error of the panel estimator. ai 
and bt are the fixed and time effects. (.) are p values, (.) are t statistics, * indicate significant at all 
conventional levels. 
 
 
 
